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Steffel: End of Life Uncertainty

END OF LIFE UNCERTAINTY: TERMINAL ILLNESS, MEDICARE
HOSPICE REIMBURSEMENT, AND THE “FALSITY” OF
PHYSICIANS’ CLINICAL JUDGMENTS
Jameson Steffel

I. INTRODUCTION
If asked to visualize what “fraud” looks like, one might envision a theft,
a computer hacker, or falsified signatures and documents. A doctor and
an elderly man sitting in a hospice facility, on the other hand, seem like
unlikely culprits. Although a hospice facility and fraud may not be an
intuitive pairing, it is estimated that fraud and inaccurate billing cost the
federal government’s Medicare program as much as $60 billion dollars
annually.1 Studies have linked hospice facilities to enrolling patients who
are not terminally ill and falsifying patient documentation, among other
appalling behaviors.2 Naturally, efforts to combat these types of behaviors
have found their way into the United States federal courts.3 Questions
have arisen regarding the behavior of America’s most trusted profession 4,
medical professionals, within the hospice setting.
Relators and the Government have relied on the Federal False Claims
Act (“FCA”) to bring actions against hospice facilities for billing
Medicare for end-of-life care to allegedly ineligible patients. 5 To prevail
on an FCA claim, plaintiffs must prove that a claim for reimbursement
for Medicare Hospice Benefit (“MHB”) was “false” under the FCA. Often
central to the “false” element of the claim is the sufficiency of a doctor’s
“clinical judgment” in labeling a patient as terminally ill. 6 Recently, a
budding circuit split has developed regarding what can deem a doctor’s

1. Ashleigh Garrison, Medicare’s Most Indefensible Fraud Hotspot: Hospice Care, CNBC (Aug.
2018),
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/02/medicares-most-despicable-indefensible-fraud-hotspothospice-care.html.
2. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OEI-02-1600570,VULNERABILITIES IN THE MEDICARE HOSPICE PROGRAM AFFECT QUALITY CARE AND PROGRAM
INTEGRITY: AN OIG PORTFOLIO 1 (July 2018), available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-02-1600570.pdf?utm_source=STAT+Newsletters&amp;utm_campaign=a14adc5bd9MR_COPY_09&amp;utm_medium=email&amp;utm_term=0_8cab1d7961-a14adc5bd9-150483829.
3. See infra Parts II and III.
4. Megan Brenan, Nurses Again Outpace Other Professions for Honesty, Ethics, GALLUP (Dec.
2018),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/245597/nurses-again-outpace-professions-honestyethics.aspx?g_source=link_NEWSV9&g_medium=NEWSFEED&g_campaign=item_&g_content=Nurs
es%2520Again%2520Outpace%2520Other%2520Professions%2520for%2520Honesty%2c%2520Ethic
s;%20see%20also%20https://www.pewresearch.org/science/2019/08/02/findings-at-a-glance-medicaldoctors/.
5. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2019).
6. Id. at 1285.
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clinical judgment as “false” for the purposes of FCA liability. 7 In the
Eleventh Circuit’s United States v. AseraCare, Inc. opinion, the court held
that a difference in two doctors’ clinical judgments, without more, was
insufficient to show falsity under the FCA. 8 However, just six months
later, the Third Circuit in United States v. Care Alternatives explicitly
departed from the Eleventh Circuit’s rule, instead holding that a
difference in expert opinion may create a triable, genuine dispute of
material fact regarding the falsity of a doctor’s clinical judgment.9
This Article explores the aforementioned circuit split and focuses on
how these two recent cases have interpreted both the language of the FCA
as well as the standards required of medical professionals by Medicare
and the MHB. Further, based on the plain language meaning of the
statutes and guidance, along with general policy concerns, this Article
argues that the approach taken by the Eleventh Circuit in AseraCare is
not only the correct legal interpretation but also the better policy
approach.
Part II of this Article provides a foundational understanding of the
FCA, qui tam claims, and the current guidance provided to medical
professionals who try to use the federal MHB for reimbursement of
medical services provided to patients. Part II also discusses two
background cases that initially ruled on the FCA’s “falsity” element and
were later relied upon in the two most recent cases that split the circuits.
Part III analyzes the two recent cases that have directly caused the split:
United States v. AseraCare, Inc.,10 and United States ex rel. Druding v.
Care Alternatives.11 Part IV argues that although there is a genuine need
to combat fraud within the hospice medical arena, dueling expert
opinions, without more, should always be considered insufficient to
create a question of falsity under the FCA. Further, Part IV suggests that
the appropriate avenue to combat subjective, yet questionable, clinical
judgments of doctors is through legislation, not the courts.
Finally, Part V concludes by summarizing the above issues and sides
with the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Asera Care, Inc. Overall, due to the
naturally uncertain and subjective nature of the elderly populations’
health in their waning months and years on earth, medical professionals
should be granted the deference given to them by the plain language of
7. Jessica E Joseph et al., Third Circuit Creates Budding Circuit Split in United States v. Care
Alternatives, Ruling That "Objective Falsity" Is Not Required Under FCA, FOLEY & LARDNER LLP (Mar.
2020),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/03/third-rules-objective-falsity-notrequired-fca.
8. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1281.
9. United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2020). (“Care
Alternatives”).
10. 938 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019).
11. 952 F.3d 89 (3d Cir. 2020).
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the regulations when they make clinal judgments of terminal illness.
Stricter scrutiny of medical professionals’ clinical judgments of terminal
illness could result in worse health outcomes for the same patients for
whom the MHB was initially implemented to help.12
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Federal False Claims Act (FCA) 13
Today, the FCA serves as a primary tool for the United States
government to combat fraud against the government and to protect the
federal treasury.14 The FCA’s origins are rooted in the United States Civil
War.15 During the war, Congress received disturbing reports that detailed
contractors defrauding the Union military in their supply contracts. 16 The
reports led to the FCA bill, which was generally well supported and
designed to “prevent and punish frauds” upon the United States
Government.17
The design of the FCA was to “deputize an army of insiders to uncover,
inform, and pursue those government contractors who knowingly cheat
in their agreements with the government.”18 The FCA allows private
individuals to file suit on behalf of the government through its “qui tam”
provision.19 In this scenario, the individual bringing the suit on behalf of
the government is referred to as a “relator.”20 A qui tam suit must be filed
under seal and served to the U.S. Attorney General.21 The government is
required to investigate the allegation and then may decide whether to
intervene or decline to intervene. 22 If the government chooses to
intervene, then the government holds primary responsibility for
prosecuting the action.23
12. See History of Hospice Care; Hospice: A Historical Perspective, NAT’L HOSPICE &
PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., https://www.nhpco.org/hospice-care-overview/history-of-hospice/.
13. 31 U.S.C. § 3729.
14. James B. Helmer Jr., False Claims Act: Incentivizing Integrity for 150 Years for Rogues,
Privateers, Parasites and Patriots, 81 U. CIN. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (2013), available
athttps://scholarship.law.uc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1153&context=uclr.
15. Id. at 1264.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 1265. (citing CONG. GLOBE, 37TH CONG., 3D SESS. 955, 348 (1863) (statement of Sen.
Wilson)).
18. Id. at 1262.
19. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
20. The
False
Claims
Act:
A
Primer,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
2,https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/civil/legacy/2011/04/22/C-FRAUDS_FCA_Primer.pdf.
21. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a), (b)(4), (5).
23. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).
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The primary incentive for a relator to bring a claim under the FCA is
money. Those found to be in violation of the act are liable to the federal
government for a standard monetary civil penalty plus three times the
amount of damages which the government sustained because of the act(s)
of the violator.24 If the government intervenes, then the relator is entitled
to receive between fifteen and twenty-five percent of the amount
ultimately recovered by the government. 25 If the government does not
intervene, the individual is still entitled to receive between twenty-five
and thirty percent of whatever is recovered through the action or
settlement.26 Successful FCA claims can often result in multimillion
dollar payouts to the relators who originally brought the claim. 27
Generally speaking, to be found liable under the FCA, a person must
knowingly submit a false claim or cause another to submit a false record
or statement material to a fraudulent claim, to the United States
government.28 The statute also encompasses conspiring to submit a false
claim and knowingly avoiding due payments to the government.29
Knowledge is defined by the statue to include (1) actual knowledge, (2)
deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the submitted information,
and (3) reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information. 30
Importantly, the statute does not require proof of specific intent to
defraud.31 From the above requirements, an FCA claim is broken down
into four elements: falsity, causation, knowledge, and materiality.32
Central to the circuit split discussed in this Article is the element of falsity.
B. The Medicare Hospice Benefit
Congress established the Medicare Hospice Benefit (“MHB”) in
1983.33 The MHB shifts patient treatment from “curative” care to
“palliative” care.34 Curative care is designed to focus on improving an
24. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
25. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1).
26. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(2).
27. Todd Yoder, DOJ Announces Four New False Claims Act Settlements, THE NAT’L L. REV.
(Apr. 15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/doj-announces-four-new-false-claims-actsettlements.
28. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
29. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(C); 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(G). However, this does not apply to tax
claims under the Internal Revenue Code. (31 U.S.C. § 3729(d)).
30. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1).
31. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(1)(B).
32. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 94 (3d Cir. 2020).
33. 48 Fed. Reg. 56,008 (Dec. 16, 1983) (codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 400, 405, 408, 409, 418, 420,
421, 489).
34. James F. Barger, Jr., Symposium Article: Life, Death, and Medicare Fraud: The Corruption of
Hospice and What the Private Public Partnership Under the Federal False Claims Act is Doing About It,
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individual patient’s medical condition, where palliative care instead
emphasizes “pain-relief, comfort, and emotional and spiritual support to
patients with a terminal diagnosis.”35 Today, a growing number of
individuals facing a terminal medical diagnosis choose to forgo
traditional curative care for palliative hospice treatment. In 2016, the
MHB provided hospice care to around 1.4 million beneficiaries, a fiftythree percent increase from a decade earlier. 36 In total, in 2016 Medicare
reimbursed $16.7 billion for hospice related care. 37
Medicare and Medicaid programs may provide payment to hospice
providers for healthcare service costs incurred under the Social Security
Act.38 However, to be eligible to elect hospice care, MBH requires written
confirmation of an individual’s diagnosis as terminally ill. 39 Certification
must be done by the physician and medical director. 40 “Terminally ill” is
defined as an individual whose medical prognosis is a life expectancy of
six months or less.41 Further, regulations also require that clinical
information and other documentation supporting the medical prognosis
be filed in the medical record with the written certification of terminal
illness.42 Therefore, a signed certification without a medically sound basis
supporting the clinical judgment is insufficient to support the terminally
ill clinical judgment for MHB reimbursement purposes.
However, recognizing the limitations on science’s ability to predict
when someone may die, the federal regulations admit that “[p]redicting
life is not an exact science” and allow for continual recertification of
patients who surpass their six-month timetable.43 Regulations state that
“the hospice medical director must assess and evaluate the full clinical
picture” when determining if a patient is, or continues to be, terminally
ill.44 Further, the regulations note that “we have always acknowledged the
uniqueness of every Medicare beneficiary” when determining if a patient
meets the eligibility criteria for certification of terminally ill. 45 Clearly,
the regulations recognize that subjectivity is natural and expected in

53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 13 (2016).
35. Id.at 13.
36. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 2, at 3.
37. Id.
38. Michael W. Thomas et al., False Claims Act Actions – The Developing Case Law Regarding
If and When Opinions Of Medical Necessity Can Be Fraudulent, 27 HEALTH LAW. 36, 37 (2015).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A); 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(a)
40. 41 U.S.C. § 1395f(a)(7)(A)(i).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(dd)(3)(A).
42. 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b).
43. 75 Fed. Reg. 70488 (Nov. 17, 2010); 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(d)(1) (allowing providers to collect
reimbursement for an unlimited number of recertification periods).
44. 79 Fed. Reg. 50452,50471. (Aug. 22, 2014).
45. Id.
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doctors’ clinical judgments of potentially terminally ill patients.
Local Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) contractors
and Medicare Administrative Contractors (“MACs”) help process claims
from hospice providers and provide eligibility criteria. 46 Hospice
professionals rely on Local Coverage Determinations (“LCDs”) that are
produced by local MACs as guidance for analyzing whether a patient’s
life expectancy is six months or less.47 Notably, the LCDs themselves
state that they are non-binding and are not a list of mandatory
requirements.48
C. Cases at the Cross Section of FCA’s Falsity Element and Doctors’
Clinical Judgments
1. Two Types of Falsity: United States ex rel. Polukoff v. St. Mark’s
Hosp.49
The Polukoff claim came from a former doctor-colleague of the doctordefendant.50 The relator, a former co-worker of the defendant, brought a
qui tam action against the doctor for allegedly performing thousands of
unnecessary heart surgeries. 51 Under the Medicare Act, the medical
provider received reimbursement for surgeries that were deemed
medically “reasonable and necessary.”52 The act provided that medical
providers must “certify the necessity of the services.”53 The complaint
referenced industry guidelines that advised when certain heart surgeries
were appropriate for patients who had experienced strokes, which
contradicted the medical practices of the defendant-doctor.54 The
defendant had performed an abnormally high number of these heart
surgeries and performed the surgeries in his “medically unsupported
belief” that the surgery would cure medical issues not traditionally
connected to the surgery.55 The complaint alleged that the defendant knew
Medicare would not pay for the surgery to treat the specific issues for
46. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2019); 79 Fed. Reg.
50452,50471. (Aug. 22, 2014).
47. 79 Fed. Reg. 50452, 50471 (Aug. 22, 2014).
48. Id.
49. 895 F.3d 730 (10th Cir. 2018).
50. Id. at 734.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 735.
53. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. 424.10(a) (Oct. 1, 2013)).
54. Id. at 736, 737. (The guidelines surround potential surgery for PFO closures.).
55. Id. at 737. (Normally, PFO closures were not performed until a patient had experienced at least
one stroke. The Defendant performed these surgeries in an effort to (1) prevent strokes before they
occurred or (2) to cure migraine headaches.). Id.
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which he performed the surgery, so the defendant instead “represent[ed]
that the procedures had been performed based upon [the industry] . . .
guidelines.”56 Further, the relator alleged the defendant-doctor had
himself “create[d] . . . puncture[s]. . . in patients’” hearts, who otherwise
did not have the heart condition.57
The relator’s claim was based upon his contention that the defendant
represented that the surgeries he performed “were medically reasonable
and necessary and that this representation was false” under the FCA.58
However, the district court ruled that “because opinions, medical
judgments and conclusions about which reasonable minds may differ
cannot be false for the purposes of the FCA,” the doctor’s representations
“could not be false.”59 Therefore, the relator’s FCA claims “failed as a
matter of law” and the district court dismissed the case.60
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the district court’s holding
that a “medical judgment concerning the necessity of a treatment could
not be deemed false or fraudulent under the FCA.”61 Instead, the court
held that a doctor’s certification that a procedure is reasonable and
necessary can be false under the FCA if the surgery does not fit within
Medicare’s definition of “reasonable and necessary.”62
To support its holding, the Tenth Circuit relied on its previously
developed understanding of what may be considered “false” under the
FCA.63 Previously, the Tenth Circuit had held that “false” may mean
either factually false or legally false. 64 Factual falsity covered express
claims that simply were false, such as a provider submitting incorrect
information or requesting reimbursement for a service never performed.65
Legal falsity generally covered situations when persons knowingly
certified they were in compliance with regulations that were a “condition
of payment” when, in fact, they were not.66 Since the relator’s complaint
alleged that the doctor did not comply with the “reasonable and necessary
requirement” of the regulations, the relator alleged the doctor “submitted
legally false requests for payment.”67 Under legal falsity, the fact that the
doctor misrepresented the reasoning for the surgery in order to meet the
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id.
Id. at 738.
Id. at 739.
Id.(internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
Id. at 740.
Id. at 742, 743.
Id. at 741.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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guidelines for reimbursement meant that the doctor made a false
statement under the FCA.68 For that reason, the Tenth Circuit held that
the relator had “pleaded enough to . . . survive dismissal” and reversed
the district court and remanded the case for further proceedings.69 Overall,
the Polukoff case illustrates two theories of falsity, factual and legal, that
may demonstrate that a defendant made a “false” statement to Medicare
under the FCA.
2. Piercing the Opinion Shield: United States v. Paulus70
The Paulus case concerned a well-known cardiologist who was
accused of defrauding Medicare by performing medically unnecessary
surgeries and procedures for patients.71 The complaint alleged that the
cardiologist performed procedures to place stents in patients’ arteries
when, according to the angiograms, stents were not needed. 72 The issue
primarily concerned the reading of angiograms, which are performed to
measure the severity of blockage in patients’ arteries.73 The plaintiffs’
case was built largely on the testimony of nine doctors who testified that
the angiograms did not show the level of blockage that the defendant had
reported in order to justify the medical procedure. 74 The doctors further
alleged the defendant “systematically exaggerated the amount of
blockage he saw on the angiograms.”75 On the other hand, the defendant
contended he could not have made a false statement when interpreting the
angiograms because (1) different doctors interpret angiograms differently
and (2) multiple studies existed which illustrated large variability in the
percent of blockage reported among doctors based on their readings of
angiograms.76 The defendant argued that since the studies showed large
“inter-observer variability,” his allegedly false reporting of blockage
could not be considered a false statement for FCA purposes.77
At the district court level, a jury convicted the cardiologist of
committing healthcare fraud and making false statements based on the
jury’s belief that he exaggerated the extent of the blockage in patients.78
68. Id. at 743, 744.
69. Id. at 743.
70. 894 F.3d 267 (6th Cir. 2018).
71. Id. at 270.
72. Id. at 272.
73. Id. at 271.
74. Id. at 273, 274. Often times the defendant had reported as high as 80% blockage, when,
according to the experts there was no blockage present in the angiograms. Id.
75. Id. at 274.
76. Id. at 272.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 270.
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However, the district court set aside the guilty verdicts, holding that, as a
matter of law, the plaintiffs “failed to prove falsity,” an essential element
of the crime.79 In the court’s view, the degree of blockage was a
“subjective medical opinion” that, based on evidence presented at trial,
was a “difficult task” that “cardiologists frequently disagreed” over.80
Therefore, the defendant’s statement about the degree of blockage “could
neither be false or fraudulent.”81
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit disagreed and overruled the district court,
explicitly stating that the degree of blockage shown on an angiogram “is
a fact capable of proof or disproof.”82 Moreover, the court stated that a
“doctor who deliberately inflates the blockage he sees on an angiogram
has told a lie; if he does so to bill . . . more . . . then he has also committed
fraud.”83 The court’s decision rested on whether the plaintiffs could prove
that the defendant did not honestly report what he saw on the angiogram. 84
It reasoned that if a statement was “capable of confirmation or
contradiction” and demonstrated as untrue, this may show “that the
defendant made a false statement” satisfying the “falsity” element of the
offense.85 The court also clarified that “[o]rdinarily, facts are the only item
that fits in this category; opinion – when given honestly – are almost never
false . . . but opinions are not, and have never been, completely insulated
from scrutiny.”86 Then, the court further deduced that “opinions may
trigger liability for fraud when they are not honestly held.” 87 For this
reason, the court opined the defendant was convicted “for misrepresenting
facts, not giving opinions . . . [the defendant] was charged with lying
about the results.”88 Overall, the court suggested that medical opinions
can be deemed false if not honestly held. Further, the way to demonstrate
that opinions are not honestly held is to evidence underlying facts, upon
which the opinion is based, that are capable of proof or disproof.

79. Id. at 274, 275.
80. Id. at 275.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 276. (The defendant “repeatedly and systematically saw one thing on the angiogram and
consciously wrote down another, and used that misinformation to perform and bill unnecessary
procedures. The difficulty of interpreting angiograms has no bearing on the capacity of these statements
to be false.”).
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III. THE SPLIT
The two cases central to the circuit split both rely on the statutory
language of the FCA and the regulations surrounding the MHB to arrive
at different conclusions as to what exactly determines “falsity” of medical
professionals’ clinical judgments under the FCA in the hospice setting.
First, this Part will discuss the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in United States
v. AseraCare, Inc., which allows hospice providers to more easily prevail
against FCA claims at the summary judgment stage.89 Second, this Part
will discuss the Third Circuit’s ruling in United States v. Care
Alternatives, which explicitly departs from the holding in United States v.
AseraCare, Inc. by rejecting the Eleventh Circuit’s “objective falsehood”
standard.90 The practical result of the Care Alternatives ruling is that
relators and the government are more likely to survive the summary
judgment stage and create a triable issue of fact simply by providing
dueling expert opinions.91
A. United States v. AseraCare, Inc.
The AseraCare litigation arose from three former AseraCare
employees who, acting as qui tam relators, alleged that AseraCare had
practices of knowingly submitting unsubstantiated Medicare claims in
violation of the FCA.92 The Government chose to intervene in the suit.93
The Government further alleged that AseraCare knowingly employed
reckless business practices that enabled AseraCare to receive Medicare
reimbursement for patients who were not eligible for MHB because it was
“financially lucrative” and, thus, misspent millions of Medicare dollars.94
The Government’s case fell under the “false certification” theory of
FCA liability.95 Liability under this theory arises when a defendant falsely
“implies that it has complied with a statutory or regulatory requirement”
when, in fact, it has not. 96 The Government first found over 2,000 hospice
patients that AseraCare billed Medicare for at least 365 continuous days
of hospice care and, within that group, created a sample of 223 patients.97

89. Supra Part III.A.
90. Supra Part III.B.
91. Id.
92. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 2019).
93. Id.at 1284.
94. Id. (“The complaint described a corporate climate that pressured sales and clinical staff to meet
aggressive monthly quotas for patient intake and . . . discouraged meaningful physician involvement in
eligibility determinations”).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Then, the Government relied on the expert testimony of a doctor who
identified 123 patients from that sample pool who, in his opinion, were
ineligible for MHB when AseraCare filed for its Medicare
reimbursement.98 Centrally, the doctor, in his medical opinion, did not
believe that the medical records of the identified patients supported
AseraCare’s certification of terminal illness, since the records did not
support a life expectancy of six months or less.99 The doctor made clear
that his testimony was a reflection only of his own clinical judgment and
that he did not think that a doctor who held a belief counter to his was
“necessarily wrong.”100 AseraCare presented its own expert whose
testimony “directly contradicted” the Government doctor’s expert
testimony.101
At the heart of the disagreement between the experts was how exactly
medical professionals should analyze patient life expectancy.102
According to the Government expert, physicians should use a “checkbox
approach” that assesses terminal illness by comparing the patient’s
medical records to LCD and medical guidelines to determine a specific
diagnosis that would deem the patient “terminally ill” under MHB
guidelines.103 On the other hand, AseraCare’s experts “considered but did
not formulaically apply the LCD guidance in making their assessment.”104
Overall, the approach presented by AseraCare was a more “holistic”
approach compared to the more objective standard suggested by the
Government’s expert.105
It is important to understand the AseraCare case’s nontraditional
procedural posture to better comprehend the conclusions and rulings of
the district court. After discovery, AseraCare initially moved for
summary judgment based on the Government’s failure to adduce
evidence of the “falsity” element required for FCA claims. 106 AseraCare
asked the district court to apply a “reasonable doctor” standard for the
purposes of assessing falsity under the FCA.107 The “reasonable doctor”
standard would require the Government to show that any “reasonable
physician applying his or her clinical judgment could not have held the
opinion that the patient at issue was terminally ill.”108 Although the
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1287.
Id.
Id. at 1288.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1286.
Id.
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district court found this standard “appealing and logical,” it ultimately
decided not to apply it and denied AseraCare’s motion.109 In reasoning its
denial, the court concluded that questions remained regarding whether
clinical information and other documentation relied upon by AseraCare
actually supported AseraCare’s “terminally ill” judgment. 110
Against the opposition of the Government, the district court next
decided to bifurcate the trial into two phases: phase one on the falsity
element and phase two on the remaining FCA elements.111 As a result, the
Government’s witness testimony regarding AseraCare’s procedures and
practices was allowed, but only to show context and not to rebut
AseraCare’s own expert testimony. 112 After the dueling expert opinions
were presented in phase one of the trial, the case was sent to the jury,
whose “sole job . . . was to review the medical records of each patient and
decide which expert’s testimony seemed more persuasive”—a classic
battle of the experts.113 The question presented to the jury was “whether
a particular patient should [have been] characterized as ‘terminally ill’ at
the time of certification.”114 Ultimately the jury answered special
interrogatories regarding each of the 123 patients at issue and found false
claims for 104 of the patients.115
Unfortunately for the Government, the favorable partial jury verdict
had a short lifespan. After the verdict, AseraCare moved for judgment as
a matter of law, contending that the court applied the wrong legal standard
in its jury instructions and again campaigned for the reasonable doctor
standard.116 The district court agreed and ordered a new trial. 117 The court
concluded that proper jury instructions would have stated “(1) that the
FCA’s falsity element requires proof of an objective falsehood; and (2)
that a mere difference of opinion between physicians, without more, is
not enough to show falsity.”118 However, the district court did not stop
there. It reconsidered AseraCare’s motion for summary judgment under
its newly adopted legal standard that required the Government to show an
“objective falsehood” to create an issue of fact regarding the falsity
element.119 Under this approach, the court granted summary judgment in
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1288.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1289
116. Id. at 1289-90.
117. Id. at 1290.
118. Id.
119. Id. (The district court was able to reconsider summary judgment sua sponte under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 56(f)(3).).
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AseraCare’s favor because “the Government [had] failed to point the
court to any admissible evidence to prove falsity other than [the doctor’s]
opinion that medical records . . . did not support the Certification of
Terminal Illness.”120 Since the government lacked evidence of an
objective falsehood, it “could not prove the falsity element of its FCA
claim as a matter of law.”121
The Government appealed the decision. The Eleventh Circuit started
its analysis by noting that the issue before the court was an issue of first
impression.122 Specifically, the court “considered that standard for falsity
in the context of the [MHB], where the controlling condition of
reimbursement is a matter of clinical judgment.”123 The court summarized
that the Government had essentially argued that dueling experts who
disagree over whether a patient’s medical records support a prognosis of
terminally ill was enough to raise a factual question that should be
presented to a jury.124 On the other hand, the defendants argued that “the
determinative inquiry in an eligibility analysis is whether the certifying
physician exercised [a] genuine clinical judgment.”125 Further, as long as
the clinical judgment was genuinely held, then the accuracy of the
judgment was not a question of fact that a jury could decide was false.126
Ultimately, the court concluded that it agreed with the “general sense” of
the objectively false standard and agreed with the district court that the
jury instructions were inadequate.127
The Eleventh Circuit started by determining how the claim before the
court may fall under the FCA. The court believed there was two possible
representations that could have been deemed false under the FCA: (1) the
representation by the physician to AseraCare that a patient was terminally
ill, and (2) the representation by AseraCare to Medicare that the
physician’s clinical judgment was obtained and, therefore, that the patient
qualified as eligible for reimbursement.128 The focus of the case at hand
was based on the first representation, the representation the physician
made to AseraCare.129 Under this theory, once the hospice provider
presented to Medicare the physician’s allegedly false representation of a
patient’s terminally ill prognosis, the hospice provider was then deemed

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1292.
Id.
Id. at 1291.
Id. at 1295, 1296.
Id. at 1296.
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in violation of the FCA if the prognosis was, in fact, false.130
Naturally, the question before the court became what exactly may deem
a physician’s clinical judgment as “false.” The court looked almost
exclusively to the text of the MHB statute and its regulations to find its
answer.131 Overall, the court required that hospice providers must submit
a claim that certifies a patient as terminally ill. 132 The certification must
be in writing, be based on a clinical judgment, and the reimbursement
must be for payments that were “reasonable and necessary” for the
management of the terminal illness.133 Further, the regulations required
that “clinical information and other documentation . . . support the
medical prognosis” and accompany the request for reimbursement. 134
The court further noted that the regulations often made room for
subjectivity. For example, the required narrative explanation of the
physician’s clinical judgment could not “contain check boxes or standard
language” and must consider several factors including both “current
subjective and objective medical findings.”135 Overall, the court
emphasized that the regulations clearly made obtaining the physician’s
clinical judgment the centerpiece of the MHB eligibility. 136
The main constraint on the clinical judgment was simply that the
underlying medical documentation must support the judgment.137
However, the regulations also emphasized that the nature of a clinical
judgment is not a matter of medical fact.138 Moreover, the court reasoned
that “none of the relevant language state[d] that the documentary record
underpinning . . . [the] judgment must prove the prognosis,” and also cited
where the regulations conceded that “predicting life expectancy is not an
exact science” to explain why those who wrote the implementing
regulations chose to show deference to the medical professional making
the judgment.139 The court disagreed with the Government’s approach
that underlying documentation must support the physician’s certification
“as a factual matter.”140 Instead, “the relevant regulation requires only that
clinical information and other documentation that support the medical
prognosis . . . accompany the certification and be filed in the medical

130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id. at 1292-95.
Id. at 1292.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id. at 1293.
Id. (quoting 75 Fed. Reg. 70372, 70448).
Id. at 1294.
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record.”141 Overall, as long as the clinical judgment represented a
“reasonable interpretation of the relevant medical records, then the
physician’s clinical judgment should dictate eligibility. “To conclude that
the supporting documentation must, standing alone, prove the validity of
the physician’s initial clinical judgment would read more into the legal
framework than its language allows.”142
The Government argued that the ruling essentially crippled the
Government’s ability to bring FCA claims against hospice providers
because all hospice providers would need to justify their request for
reimbursement is a physician who was willing provide the hospice
provider with a clinical judgment of their liking. 143 However, in response
to this fear, the court reminded the Government that the clinical judgment
of a physician must be informed by the patient’s medical records.144 It
also stated that if Congress had intended for a more rigid and objective
standard for determining terminal illness, it would have used different
language.145 Instead of requiring that medical records “support” the
clinical judgment, it could have instead used “demonstrate” or “prove.”146
Simply put, it was not the role of the court to require more certitude than
the plain language of the statute and regulations implied; such reading
was not consistent with the text or design of the law.147
After holding that a “claim cannot be ‘false’—and thus not trigger FCA
liability—if the underlying clinical judgment does not reflect an objective
falsehood,” the court also commented on how plaintiffs could prove an
objective falsehood moving forward.148 Evidence that a physician either
failed to (1) review a patient’s medical records, (2) familiarize himself
with the patient’s condition, or (3) subjectively believe the patient was
terminally ill, could all prove an objective falsehood for FCA purposes.149
The court also noted that evidence “that no reasonable physician could
have concluded that a patient was terminally ill” would also suffice to
show an objective falsity.150 In contrast, however, the court stated that “a
properly formed and sincerely held clinical judgment [was] not untrue
even if a different physician later contends the judgment [was] wrong.”151
Overall, under the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, if a plaintiff alleges false
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. (Internal quotes omitted. Emphasis omitted. Quoting 42 C.F.R. § 418.22(b)(2)).
Id.
Id. at 1295.
Id.
Id. at 1294.
Id.
Id. at 1294, 1295.
Id. at 1296, 1297.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
Id.
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certification for hospice care, the plaintiff must identify “facts and
circumstances surround[ing] the patient’s certification that are . . . [an]
[im]proper exercise of a physician’s clinical judgment.”152 Due to the
subjectivity of the clinical judgment and the deference shown to the
physician’s judgment by the statute and regulations, the court articulated
that future plaintiffs best rely on outside facts and circumstances to show
the clinical judgment was not a genuinely held belief.
B. United States ex rel. Druding v. Care Alternatives
As in the AseraCare case, the relators in the Care Alternatives case
consisted of former employees of the hospice care provider, Care
Alternatives.153 The former employees similarly alleged that the company
admitted patients for hospice care who should have been illegible for
MHB.154 Moreover, they alleged that Care Alternatives directed its
employees to improperly alter patients’ Medicare certifications to reflect
eligibility.155 Unlike in AseraCare, the government declined to intervene,
but the relators decided to proceed with the claim. 156
At the district court level, the central question surrounded the falsity
element of the FCA claim.157 Discovery led to “dueling expert opinions”
regarding whether the underlying medical documentation supported the
clinical judgment of terminally ill.158 The relators had a doctor examine
the records of forty-seven past patients. 159 The doctor testified that the
documentation was unsupportive of a terminally ill certification in thirtyfive percent of the patient files he reviewed. 160 The expert also went a step
further and testified that, in his view, “any reasonable physician would
have reached the conclusion he reached.”161 Care Alternatives also
presented their own expert witness who testified that, in his opinion, “a
physician could have reasonably determined” that each patient in question
was, in fact, terminally ill.162
Care Alternatives then moved for summary judgment.163 Relying on
the objective falsehood standard, Care Alternatives argued that the
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id.
Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 91 (3d Cir. 2020).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 94.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Id.
Id.
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plaintiffs “could not make out the four prima facie elements of a claim
under the FCA,” most importantly the element of falsity. 164 The district
court granted Care Alternative’s motion and based its opinion entirely on
the plaintiff’s failure to show falsity. 165 In reaching its conclusion, the
court relied on the ruling in AseraCare and held that a “mere difference
of opinion between physicians, without more, is not enough to show
falsity.”166 The crux of the court’s decision also relied on the premise that
“medical opinions are subjective and cannot be false.”167
On appeal, the Third Circuit started its analysis by discussing the MHB.
The Third Circuit generally agreed with the AseraCare court about what
providers must show to Medicare for reimbursement for patients
diagnosed as terminally ill. 168 The court also highlighted that the
regulations declared that determining the timespan of a patient’s illness
was an inexact science.169 However, the court stated that inexactness
“does not negate the fact that there must be clinical basis for the
certification.”170
However, the Third Circuit entirely departed from AseraCare
regarding what exactly was needed under the FCA to show falsity.171 The
“central question” before the court on appeal was whether a claim for
reimbursement may be considered false under the FCA if a medical expert
testifies that accompanying medical documentation does not support a
patient’s prognosis of terminally ill. 172 The court answered that question
with a “straightforward yes.”173 The court explicitly declined to adopt the
objective falsity standard and claimed the standard was inconsistent with
statute.174 Further, the court opined that the objective falsity standard
conflated the FCA elements of “falsity” and “scienter” into one
analysis.175 Instead, the court found that conflicting medical testimony
created a genuine dispute of material fact as to the element of falsity.176
Fundamental to the circuit court’s opinion was the meaning of “false”

164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (internal citations omitted).
167. Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Riley v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Hosp., 355 F.3d 370, 376 (5th
Cir. 2004)).
168. Id. at 92.
169. Id. at 93.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 95.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. 96.
176. Id. at 95.
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under the FCA statute.177 “False” was an undefined term in the statute, so
the court looked to common law to find its meaning.178 Under common
law, the court identified two ways a claim may be false: legal falsity and
factual falsity.179 Factual falsity occurred when “facts contained within
the claim were untrue.”180 Legal falsity occurred when a claimant “falsely
certifies that it has complied with a statute or regulation” for which
compliance “is a condition for government payment,” when, in fact, they
have not complied with the statute. 181 Therefore, if Care Alternatives
wrongfully certified that a patient was eligible for reimbursement, then
Care Alternatives would have made a false statement under the legal
falsity theory.182 In the circuit court’s opinion, the district court had
limited its analysis to factual falsity by implementing the objective
falsehood standard.183 Under the legal falsity standard, the relators could
show that the Care Alternatives’ physician certification failed to meet the
regulatory requirement that clinical information and other documentation
supported a “terminally ill” prognosis.184 Under this theory, the court
stated that “disagreement between experts . . . may be evidence” of a legal
falsity, which would satisfy the falsity element of the FCA.185 Lastly, to
support the idea of legal falsity, the court also relied on the Polukoff case
to demonstrate the appropriateness of using both factual and legal falsity
to evidence falsity under the FCA. 186
The court also rejected the district court’s “bright-line rule that a
doctor’s clinical judgment cannot be false.”187 For this point, the court
relied on the Sixth Circuit’s Paulus opinion, which emphasized that
medical professional’s “opinions are not, and haven never been,
completely insulated from scrutiny.”188 Specifically, the court used
Paulus to highlight that a medical opinion that is not honestly held “may
trigger liability for fraud.”189 However, the court also suggested that “a
good faith medical opinion is not punishable.” 190 Overall, it was the
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 96.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 97. “In other words, our cases instruct that FCA falsity simply asks whether the claim
submitted to the government as reimbursable was in fact reimbursable, based on the conditions for
payment set by the government.”
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. (citing 10th circuit’s Polukoff and the 3rd circuit’s Paulus cases).
187. Id. at 98. (internal quotation marks omitted).
188. Id. (citing United States v. Paulus,894 F.3d 267,275 (6th Cir. 2018)).
189. Id.
190. Id.
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court’s belief that the question of whether a defendant had committed
fraud by misrepresenting underlying medical documentation or had acted
in good faith was a suitable question for a jury to decide.191 In the court’s
opinion, it was clear that the credibility of expert testimony was
“exclusively” a judgment for the jury.192
The Third Circuit also addressed the AseraCare ruling and why it chose
to depart from its sister circuit.193 Specifically, the court highlighted the
difference in the framing of the falsity question by the Government and
the hospice provider.194 Under the Government’s framing in AseraCare,
clinical information and accompanying documents must actually support
the physician’s certification.195 Whereas from the defendant’s point of
view, the supporting documentation requirement was “only designed to
address the mandate that there be a medical basis for the certification.196
By adopting the approach suggested by AseraCare, the Third Circuit
believed that its sister court “limited the relevant inquiry to whether the
Government had adduced sufficient evidence to the accuracy of the
physician’s . . . judgment.”197 In the Third Circuit’s opinion, this
essentially excluded legal falsity and made plaintiffs rely entirely on
factual falsity.198
The Third Circuit also suggested that the Eleventh Circuit “determined
that clinical judgments cannot be untrue” because it held that “a
reasonable difference of opinion among physicians . . . is not sufficient
on its own” to show falsity under the FCA.”199 Again, the Third Circuit
believed this approach limited falsity to factual falsity.200 In the end, on
the basis of legal falsity, the court held that physician expert testimony
that disagrees with the hospice provider’s certification does in fact create
a triable issue of fact that should be left for a jury to decide. 201 In the case
at hand, the relators’ physician-expert testimony provided sufficient
evidence to create a triable issue of fact regarding falsity.202

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 98-100.
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 99-100.
Id. at 100
Id. 100-01
Id.
Id. at 101.
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IV. DISCUSSION
AseraCare, Care Alternatives, and the other previously discussed cases
highlight a growing tension regarding how exactly plaintiffs are supposed
to demonstrate the falsity element of the FCA in the hospice context.
More specifically, does the plain language of the FCA and MHB statutes
and regulations require more than simply dueling expert testimony to
create a triable issue of fact that should be presented to a jury? Care
Alternatives certainly suggests the answer to that question is a
straightforward no.203 However, although Care Alternatives characterizes
the AseraCare holding as providing an inappropriate “bright-line rule”
based on objective falsity, the AseraCare holding does nothing of the sort.
First, AseraCare does not create a bright-line rule. In fact, AseraCare
implicitly considered legal falsity as well as factual falsity in the premise
of its analysis.204 Secondly, based on the plain language of the statute and
regulations governing end-of-life treatment, the law purposely grants a
large amount of deference to a physician’s clinical judgment of terminal
illness because of the highly subjective nature of the judgment compared
to other areas of medical expertise. Moving forward, courts should move
away from the Care Alternatives holding and realign themselves with the
logic and holding of the AseraCare court.
The objective falsehood standard adopted in AseraCare (1) covers both
factual and legal falsity, (2) does not create a bright-line rule, and (3) is
the more appropriate reading of the statute based on Congress’ desire to
grant flexibility to the physician making a judgment. This is not to say
that a physician’s clinical judgment should never be questioned or
subjected to a jury’s scrutiny. Rather, to create a triable issue of fact as to
whether a physician’s clinical judgment was “false,” a plaintiff must first
demonstrate underlying facts that support an inference that the physician
did not honestly hold the clinical judgment he or she made. Of course, a
plaintiff may always present facts that demonstrate a clinical judgment
was inappropriate because the physician did not meet or perform one of
the other explicit requirements necessary under statute to make an
appropriate clinical judgment.
A. Factual and Legal Falsity Are Both Considered Under AseraCare’s
“Objective Falsehood” Standard
One of the prominent reasons that Care Alternatives decided to depart
from its sister court’s AseraCare ruling was because the Care Alternatives
court believed the objective falsehood standard limited falsity to factual
203. Id. at 95.
204. Supra Part IV.A.
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falsity and disregarded legal falsity.205 In reality, the AseraCare objective
falsehood standard accounts for legal falsity as well as factual falsity.
First, the objective falsehood standard can be applied to the requirement
that medical documentation accompanying the certification of terminal
illness “supports” the certification. Plaintiffs may still evidence falsity
under the legal falsity theory by inquiring whether clinical information
and other documentation accompanying a certification of terminal illness
supports the physician’s certification. In fact, this is the exact approach
the Government took in both AseraCare and Care Alternatives.
The court in AseraCare did not have an issue with the Government
evidencing falsity under legal falsity theory. Rather, the issue was that the
Government only provided an expert who said he personally disagreed
with the doctor.206 Moreover, the Government’s expert witness could not
say that another doctor “who disagreed with him . . . was necessarily
wrong.”207 As the court stated in AseraCare, the dueling expert witnesses
simply “fundamentally differed as to how a doctor should analyze a
patient’s life expectancy.”208 The Government did not succeed on their
claim for that exact reason. It is important to distinguish the court’s issue
with the lack of evidence from their overall framing of falsity. Plainly, the
AseraCare court did not take issue with evidencing falsity through legal
falsity; in fact, the court’s analysis implicitly supported its reasoning.
Instead, the real issue was that the Government lacked any evidence to
legal falsity other than its expert’s opinion, which the court concluded
was insufficient.
It is simply wrong to state that AseraCare did not consider a legal
falsity theory. The objective falsehood standard was not implemented to
cabin falsity to just factual falsity. Instead, it simply required that
something more than a difference in opinion was necessary to explain
why the defendant’s clinical judgment was false. The objective falsehood
205. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d at 96.“Objective falsity standard is also at odds with this Court’s
cases that have interpreted falsity to encompass a theory of liability based on non-compliance with
regulatory instructions and not just objectively verifiable facts.” (internal quotation marks omitted).
206. United States v. AseraCare, Inc., 938 F.3d 1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2019). The Government
presented expert testimony that, in the expert’s own clinical judgment “the medical records of the patients
at issue did not support . . . terminal illness.” (internal quotation marks omitted). The court’s issue was
not with how the Government framed falsity under legal falsity theory. Rather the issue was that there
was no other evidence on record besides the medical expert’s personal opinion that the Defendant’s
clinical judgments were false. The court made this abundantly clear when later it stated, “a plaintiff
alleging that a patient was falsely certified . . . must identify facts and circumstances surrounding the
patient’s certification that are inconsistent with . . . proper . . . judgment.” Id. at 1297.
207. Id. at 1287, 1288. (The Government’s expert witness even “himself changed his opinion
concerning the eligibility of certain patients over the course of the proceeding.”). Later, he explained his
change of opinion on the fact that he “was not the same physician” three year previous than he was now.
Id. at 1288. This in of itself serves as evidence to the overall incredibly subjective nature of the “terminal
illness” clinical judgment.
208. Id.
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standard still allows plaintiffs to raise a question of falsity under legal
falsity, it simply requires underlying objective facts that support the
apparent disagreement between doctors.209 Due to the highly subjective
nature of a terminally ill clinical judgment, this requirement is justified.
Without such a requirement, all a plaintiff would need to find to create a
triable issue of fact is a single doctor who was willing to disagree with the
defendant-doctor’s judgment, after an ex post review of the supporting
documents.
Second, AseraCare held that a disagreement between experts, without
more, does not create a triable issue of fact. 210 This framing does not
foreclose a legal falsity theory of liability. It just means that another
expert’s opinion alone cannot raise a triable issue of fact regarding legal
falsity. Instead, to raise a question of legal falsity, there needs to be an
underlying fact that plaintiffs may point to and say, “this is why my expert
is right and the defense’s expert was wrong.” Under this approach,
plaintiffs may raise a triable issue of fact based on legal falsity, but the
legal falsity must be based on something objective. Doing so does not
dismantle legal falsity. Instead, it helps to make sure that juries are not
making purely medical judgments or simply deciding which doctor’s
opinion they like best.
Paulus is a fitting example where the plaintiffs applied legal falsity
theory to question whether clinical information actually supported the
physician’s judgment that the amount of blockage made a stent procedure
necessary.211 In Paulus, experts were not debating medical theory.
Instead, the court noted that the amount of artery blockage that appeared
on an angiogram was an objective fact that may be proven true or false
and that the jury could decide. 212 This is a textbook example of legal
falsity; however, the amount of blockage the doctor reported was an
underlying objective fact that could have passed the objective falsehood
standard of AseraCare. The plaintiff in Paulus had experts who disagreed,
but it also had more. What moved the disagreement from a medical debate
to a triable issue of fact was the objective percentage of blockage shown
on the reports. A jury could decide whether the defendant-doctor lied
about the blockage he witnessed on the angiogram. On the other hand, in
AseraCare, the plaintiffs did not supply any other evidence of falsity
besides their disagreeing expert. 213
209. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1301. “[T]he mere difference of reasonable opinion between
physicians, without more . . . does not constitute an objective falsehood.” (emphasis added).
210. Id.
211. United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 270 (6th Cir. 2018).
212. Id. at 275. “We make it explicit now: The degree of stenosis is a fact capable of proof or
disproof.”
213. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1290. “The Government [had] failed to point the court to any
admissible evidence to prove falsity other than [the doctor’s] opinion.”
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B. The Objective Falsehood Standard Does Not Create A Bright-Line
Rule Protecting Medical Professionals
The Care Alternatives court’s characterization214 of AseraCare’s
objective falsehood standard as a bright-line rule that a doctor’s clinical
judgment cannot be “false,” is simply a misunderstanding of the objective
falsehood standard. The objective falsehood standard modestly requires
that some underlying fact(s) be present to suggest falsity besides an
expert’s contrary medical opinion.215 In fact, the AseraCare case laid out
multiple avenues a plaintiff may take to prove a doctor’s clinical judgment
was false.216 The only bright-line rule created by the objective falsehood
standard is that there needs to be more than a medical disagreement
among experts to evidence falsity. 217 In fact, the standard even leaves
open the possibility for a purely medical disagreement to pass the
objective falsehood test by having an expert testify that “no reasonable
physician could have concluded a patient was terminally ill given the
relevant medical records.”218 In this case, the objective falsehood standard
would likely require an underlying reason as to why no doctor could have
held the clinical judgment, but that could be supported by standard
medical practices in the same way standard medical practices were used
to support evidence falsity in the Paulus case.219 Altogether, the objective
falsehood standard is far from a bright-line rule that protects physicians’
judgments under all circumstances. To the contrary, AseraCare carved
out multiple specific ways that a plaintiff can evidence falsity of a
physician’s clinical judgment under the objective falsehood rule.
C. The Overall Policy Objectives of the MHB Purposely Grant
Deference to Doctors’ Clinical Judgments of Terminal Illness
It can still be argued that requiring underlying objective facts to create
a triable issue on falsity under the legally false theory is too large of a
214. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 98 (3d Cir. 2020).
215. AseraCare, 938 F.3d at 1290.
216. Id.at 1297. “Certifying physician fails to review patient’s medical records or otherwise
familiarize himself with the patient’s condition . . . [or] physician did not, in fact, subjectively believe that
his patient was terminally ill . . . [or] no reasonable physician could have concluded that [the] patient was
terminally ill given the relevant medical records.” The court continued, “In each of these examples, the
clinical judgment on which the claim is based contains a flaw that can be demonstrated through verifiable
facts.”
217. Id. “[A] reasonable difference of opinion among physicians reviewing medical documentation
ex post is not sufficient on its own to suggest . . . claims . . . are false under the FCA.”
218. Id.
219. United States v. Paulus, 894 F.3d 267, 271-72 (6th Cir. 2018). The court used both “the
accepted standard of medical care” and what “the medical consensus appears to be” to help determine
whether a stent was justified at certain varying levels of blockage. Id.
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burden to place on plaintiffs bringing FCA actions. Although the
requirement makes bringing an action against hospice providers more
difficult,220 more importantly, it aligns with the general deference given
to medical professionals by statutes and regulations.
From a holistic view, the regulations and rulemaking commentary
repeatedly suggest that a physician’s clinical judgment should be granted
deference because of the subjectivity involved in physicians’ clinical
judgments. First, the regulations explicitly declare that predicting life
expectancy is not an exact science. Second, for this reason, the regulations
allow for unlimited recertification of patients’ terminal illness. At the end
of the day, even in an ex post review, doctors are not always capable of
predicting the exact time or timeframe when individuals die. Third, again
due to the natural subjectivity of an individual’s health, the regulations
require that physicians consider “several factors” and both “subjective
and objective medical findings.” Finally, the regulations specifically
disallow using “check the box” language in a physician’s narrative
explanation for terminal illness.
All these factors illustrate that the judgments physicians are asked to
make are naturally complex and inexact. It is unfair to then have these
judgments second-guessed ex post facto by a jury or their professional
peers. Based on the number of factors that a physician is required to
consider under the regulations, two different physicians can both consult
the same factors, but can come to opposite clinical judgments based on
how each physician weighs each individual factor. For this reason, it
makes sense require some underlying objective fact that points to
wrongness in an opposing physician’s point-of-view. Without an
underlying objective fact, dueling expert opinions offer nothing more than
simply a difference in medical theory and opinion. Furthermore, based on
the regulations’ clear understanding of the subjectivity in the medical
decision, one cannot say that a mere difference in medical opinion alone
makes another physician’s opinion false. The Government’s expert
witness in AseraCare admitted as much when he reached the opposite
conclusion of AseraCare’s doctor but could not say this meant that the
other doctor’s opinion was wrong.
Respecting the deference shown to medical professionals in the statute
is especially important in the hospice setting. Care Alternatives relied on
both Polukoff and Paulus as examples of when a medical judgment can
be considered false.221 Although both cases do exemplify when a medical
judgment may be deemed false, it is equally important to appreciate the
220. See Christopher J. Donovan, Lisa M. Noller & Lori A. Rubin, AseraCare FCA Ruling Is A
Boon
For
Health
Providers,
FOLEY
&
LARDNER
LLP
(Jan.
31,
2020),
https://www.foley.com/en/insights/publications/2020/01/aseracare-fca-ruling-boon-for-health-providers.
221. Care Alternatives, 952 F.3d 89, 97-98 (3d Cir. 2020).
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difference in type of medical opinions questioned in Polukoff and Paulus
versus AseraCare and Care Alternatives.
AseraCare and Care Alternatives questioned physicians’ clinical
judgments of terminal illness. As previously discussed, these judgments
are, medically speaking, incredibly subjective judgments that medical
professionals are required to made to determine hospice eligibility. When
no other evidence is presented as to the falsity of a physician’s clinical
judgment, juries are essentially asked to perform an after-the-fact review
to determine which expert-opinion testimony and medical theory is more
persuasive. Ideally, a jury would weigh all of the same factors medical
professionals are asked to weigh and somehow determine from those
factors, without a medical degree, which expert was correct; or at a
minimum, whether the plaintiff’s expert-testimony was persuasive
enough that the jury believed the defendant’s clinical judgment was false.
Alternatively, Polukoff and Paulus required juries to make a much less
medically intensive judgment. In both cases, the jury had to decide on an
underlying objective fact that did not require jurors to have a medical
degree to understand. In Paulus, the jury needed to decide whether the
blockage that the cardiologist reported on his reports was actually present
on the angiogram. Essentially, the question was whether the doctor lied
and misrepresented what he saw. In Polukoff, the question was whether
the doctor’s patients had the pre-existing conditions to justify
reimbursement for their surgeries, or whether the doctor lied about the
underlying reason for the procedure and created punctures in patients’
hearts to justify reimbursement. In the end, both the Polukoff and Paulus
juries considered whether the doctor lied or misrepresented facts, not
which doctors’ medical theories made more sense to them from a
layman’s perspective.
Both Polukoff and Paulus are examples of when a doctor’s clinical
judgment is false for the purposes of the FCA. However, both also
represent cases that involved underlying facts and circumstances that a
jury of laymen can decide without needing medical educations.
Conversely, the jurors in AseraCare and Care Alternatives were asked to
perform more complex and medically intensive analyses than the
previous Polukoff and Paulus jurors. Due to the number of factors a
physician is required to consider under the MHB guidelines, and the
overall subjectivity of projecting an individual’s projected lifespan
generally, juries are simply incapable of concluding, as a matter of law,
that a clinical judgment of terminal illness is false, without any other
evidence to rely on besides contradicting expert testimony.
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D. Stricter Scrutiny of Medical Professionals Should be Accomplished
Through Congress, Not Courts
If the system needs a tougher “check” on doctors in the hospice setting,
the place to look is Congress, who wrote the statutes in a way that granted
the doctors a large degree of deference. It is simply not the courts’ job to
re-write the law to require stricter scrutiny of doctors’ clinical judgments
of terminal illness as the courts see fit. The plain language of the MHB
regulations clearly conveys that Congress has an appreciation for the
variety of subjective factors that should go into a physician’s clinical
judgment, as well as an appreciation for the general difficulty in
predicting how long a sick or elderly person is likely to live.
The law is written in a way that generally insulates physicians’ clinical
judgments of terminal illness from scrutiny, but does not entirely insulate
the judgments from examination. The regulations still set forth a variety
of requirements that a hospice provider must meet in order to be
reimbursed under Medicare. If a hospice provider or its medical
professionals fail to meet the necessary requirements and wrongfully
certify compliance, then those professionals can still be liable for their
actions. Also, hospice providers may be held liable if they did not
genuinely hold a belief that a patient was terminally ill or held a belief
based on medical factors that were untrue. Under all of these
circumstances, all that is required of plaintiffs is to show that their beliefs
are evidenced by some underlying objective facts that demonstrate their
belief.
In doing so, two things are accomplished: (1) medical professionals are
protected against lawsuits in scenarios where reasonable differences in
medical opinions exist; and (2) juries are not asked to make medical
judgments they are incapable of making due to their lack of medical
education. By requiring some underlying objective facts to demonstrate
how a medical judgment was wrong, juries make rulings on facts that have
medical implications, instead of making purely medical judgments.
V. CONCLUSION
Overall, AseraCare, Care Alternatives, and previous cases highlight a
growing tension regarding how exactly plaintiffs are supposed to
demonstrate the falsity element of the FCA in the context of the hospice
setting. More specifically, does the plain language of the FCA and MHB
statutes and regulations require more than simply dueling expert
testimony to create a triable issue of fact for a jury? Care Alternatives
certainly suggests the answer to that question is a straightforward no.
However, although Care Alternatives characterizes the AseraCare
holding as providing an inappropriate “bright-line rule” based on
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objective falsity, in reality the AseraCare holding does nothing of that
sort and is actually the more appropriate standard for courts to follow.
Moving forward, courts should follow AseraCare and require more than
mere dueling expert opinions to demonstrate falsity.
First, AseraCare does not create a bright-line rule that the Care
Alternatives court claims it does. In fact, AseraCare implicitly considered
legal falsity as well as factual falsity in the premise of its analysis and
provides multiple examples of how a physician’s clinical judgment can
be proved false. Secondly, based on the plain language of the statutes and
regulations governing end-of-life treatment, the law purposely grants a
large amount of deference to physicians’ clinical judgments of terminal
illness because of the comparatively highly subjective nature of the
judgment.
The objective falsity standard adopted in AseraCare (1) covers both
factual and legal falsity, (2) does not create a bright-line rule, and (3) is
the more appropriate reading of the statute based on Congress’ desire to
grant flexibility to physicians making judgments. This is not to say that a
physician’s clinical judgment should never be under scrutiny or submitted
to a jury. Rather, to create a triable issue of fact regarding falsity of a
clinical judgment, a plaintiff must evidence underlying facts that support
the inference that the physician did not honestly hold the clinical
judgment he or she made. Alternatively, the plaintiff can evidence facts
that show the clinical judgment was inappropriately made because the
physician did not meet or perform one of the other explicit requirements
necessary under statute to make an appropriate clinical judgment. If
individuals are not satisfied with the current standard, then Congress
should act to tighten the standards and requirements of physicians in the
hospice setting. Under no circumstance, however, is it appropriate for the
courts to go beyond the requirements of the regulations and more strictly
scrutinize medical professionals’ clinical judgments simply because the
court believes it to be better policy. Moving forward, courts should follow
the AseraCare ruling when determining whether a physician’s clinical
judgment was false within the hospice setting.
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